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Capital structure choice is vital in corporate financial management due to
its effect on both return and risk to investors. As such, the objective of
this research is to analyse the capital structure of listed shariah compliant
plantation companies in Bursa Malaysia. The factors that influence the
level of debt in this research are profitability, tangibility and liquidity
respectively. The research is conducted by observing financial data of 34
listed shariah compliant plantation firms in Malaysia from period 2006 to
2016. The study has used panel data and the regression analysis is based
on ordinary least square (OLS). Capital structure is the dependaple
variable referring to debt ratio of the companies, decomposed into total
debts over total assets. The independent variables are profitability,
liquidity and tangibility. Three theories of capital structure have guided
this study i.e. the Trade-Off Theory, Asymmetric Information and the
Pecking Order Theory. The study shows that profitability and tangibility
have significant positive relationship capital structure. Nevertheless,
liquidity does not have any significant relationshipwith the debt ratio. It is
most likely that liquidity is not taken into account by listed plantation
companies in Malaysia in making their capital structure decision. Since
profitability and tangibility have significant relationship with the level of
debt, the Theory of Capital Structure such as Trade Off Theory is
applicable to plantation shariah compliant firms listed in Bursa Malaysia.
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1. Introduction
Plantation is one of the sub-sectors in the agriculture sector in Malaysia. It is supervised by the
Ministry of Plantation and Commodities (MPIC). Government established Ministry of Primary Industries
in 1972 to focus on two main commodities which are tin ore and rubber. Later on, the ministry role
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extended to include palm oil, cocoa and tobacco. In 2004, the ministry was reorganized and renamed as
Ministry of Plantation Industries and Commodities. There are four main crops that have dominated the
agricultural exports ever since which are palm oil, rubber, timber and cocoa.
Agriculture makes up 8 to 12 percent of Malaysia gross domestic product (GDP) from the year 2004 to
2016. 16 percent of Malaysia’s population are employed under agriculture sector. Agriculture is now a
minor sector in Malaysia economy compared to 1960s when agriculture contributed 37 percent of
Malaysia’s GDP and employed 66 percent of labour force. The crops also shifted from food crops like
paddy to industrial crops such as palm oil and rubber. The total planted area used for agricultural is
increasing from 68 percent in 1960 to 84 percent in 2005.
Over 10 million metric tons of palm oil were produced in Malaysia and making it as one of the world’s
largest producers. Almost 85% of this was exported to international market. Malaysia has a good
reputation for producing high quality rubber product and supply for one third of world’s rubber export.
However, in the 1990s, big companies began to turn to more lucrative palm oil production. Malaysia also
is the world’s fourthlargest producer of cocoa in 1999.
The firms are required to make a crucial decision on the types of capital to be issued, in order to
finance their activities and projects. This wouldlead to the capital structure requirement that requires to be
governed by every firm to execute financial assessment before taking loan from external source of
financing. A wrongchoice in capital structuring would distressthe firms on how they spend their cash and
raise their funds. If the firmshad no proper planning on getting the funds for their activities, the firms
might misallocate the money by taking more debt through issuing more bonds or use most of the firm’s
cash beforeforecasting the impact that it would cause on the firms’ finance.  By determining suitable
optimal level of leverage for the company, it would contribute towards the company’s financial strategies.
Notwithstanding Islamic finance does not accept any element of riba’ or interest in its activities, it still
has the characteristics of both debt and equity issuances.  A significant enquiry that arises on this study is
what inspires the shariah compliance plantationfirm to elevate capital via debt. Does shariah compliance
plantation firms have similar motivation as what is being inspired by conventional firms specifically
based on trade capital structure theory namely trade off (Modigliani & Miller, 1958), pecking order
(Myers & Majluf, 1984, Mayers, 2001, Fama & French, 1998, 2005), bankruptcy cost (Berger et al, 1995,
Florackis, 2008), risk shifting (Green, 1984,  Lewis C.M et al, 1999, 2004)and others. A study devoted to
shariah compliant plantation companies would not only be interesting to the reseachers around the globe,
but equally also to investors and corporate managers in Malaysia as well as the authorities.Therefore, this
research adds one more piece to the emerging puzzle by examining the determinants of capital structure
among planation shariah compliant firms in Malaysia capital market. Furthermore, many industries in
Malaysia are relying on the performance of plantation companies because it would affect the GDP and
economy in Malaysia. The policy implication section of this paper will illuminate the implication of
findings in greater detail.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II briefly summarises the theory capital structure
particularly on the  capitalstructure. Section III discusses the data and empirical method used in this
study, Section IV presents the empirical results of the analysis and Section V concludes the paper.
2. Literature Review
The foundation of the modern theory of capital structure was initiated from Modigliani-Miller (M&M)
theorem, established by Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller (1958). This theory states that a firm’s
capital structure choice does not affect the firm’s value when the capital market is prefect or efficient with
the assumption of there is no tax imposed, no issuing cost for raising capital via debt or equity and no
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agency cost respectively. Nevertheless, it contradicts the real world practice which eventually attributes to
several other theories, also found to challenge thesefindings and define the optimal capital structure for
the firms in various perspectives such as agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, Smith & Warner
1979, Pinegar & Wilbricht 1989, Lubatkin & Chatterjee 1994, Elliot 2002), asymmetric information
(Akerlof, 1970; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Clarke & Shastri, 2001; Hasbrouck, 2005), pecking order theory
(Myers & Majluf, 1984, Mayers, 2001, Fama & French, 1998, 2005), bankruptcy cost (Berger et al, 1995,
Florackis, 2008), risk shifting (Green, 1984,  Lewis et al, 1999, 2004), backdoor equity financing (Stein,
1992,Lewis et al, 1999, 2004).
Trade off theory explicates the capital structure from the perspective of the cost-benefit of debt. Myers
(1984) customised the MM (1963) model and established the ‘static trade-off’ theory. It claims that there
is a transaction between benefits of debt usage and the financial distress. This occurs because of the
increase in the possibility of bankruptcy with the higher usage of debt. According to Myers’ (1984) trade-
off theory, firms have to set their debt levels and make their capital structure decisions. Debt gives firm
tax benefit but at the same time also raises the firm's financial risk. As such, the ratio of debt in the capital
structure increases, the value of the company also increases. This is due to the increasing present value of
marginal tax shield. Nevertheless, the increase in the present value of cost of financial distress will make
up for the increase in the marginal benefits and as the debt ratio increases, the value of firm will decline at
higher levels of debt ratio. This permits the firms to optimise their debt levels.
Other than Trade Off theory (Modigliani & Miller, 1958), there are several other theories that explain
on capital structure. The second theory is known as pecking order theory, POT (Myers and Majluf,
1984).According to POT, the firm would utilise their internal financing relatively than borrowing money
via debt. POT theory suggests that the firm willchoose to use their retained earnings first to meet with
investment requirement. Only when their internal source is not sufficient, then they would seek the
external source of financing. Issuing a new stock would be the last resort.
Asymmetric information model was initiated by Akerlof (1970) before many researchers started to
integrate with pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984). This model propagates the circumstances
that the manager of the firm has extra information from other investors with regards to the operations and
future prospect of the firms. Presuming the manager has the attention of maximising shareholders value,
the information asymmetry can affect the manager capital structure decision. This is very essential as
most of the time, the investors always rely on the action of the manager in assessing the firm’s prospect
and react based on their own interpretation of the manager’s action.
In line with the various capital structure theories, capital structure is also very important for the firms’
financing growth. When the firm has a strong financial source, it facilitates them to fund more business
operations and enlarge their firms smoothly. This influenced economic growth within industries and aided
to our country’s growth.
3. Empirical methodology and measurement of the variables
The method will describe the model specification, data source, the proposed hypothesis, identify the
variables and the measurement as well as the econometric model. The sample consists of 34 listed firms
that are shariah compliance listed on Bursa Malaysia and Ace Market over the years 2006 – 2016.
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A. Empirical Model – Multiple Regression
The following model was employed for the analysis:= + + + +
Where:
DRit = debt ratio of firm i at time t.
PROFit = profitability of firm i at time t.
TANGit = tangibility of firm i at time t.
LIQit = liquidity of firm i at time t.
= common y-intercept.
= stochastic error term of firm i at time t.
The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression is run on SPSS version 19. The model is derived on the
basis of previous studies such as Asmawi and Faridah (2013), Ozkan (2001) and Ramlall (2009).
When leverage (DR),  Y acts  as the dependent variable, Y is dependent on the other three independent
variables such as Profitability (PROF) as it expresses the relationship between the  earning of the
company over the debt  ratio. Tangibility (TANG) measured the  asset tangibilityof the firm as it
associates with the  leverage level. Liquidity(LIQD) measured the current ratio of the firm and the
relation it had on the debt’s level.
3.1 Profitability (PROF)
Profitability ratios are usually used to measure how efficiently firms use their assets and how firms
manage their operations (Ross, Westerfield & Jordan 2009). These ratios also measure the firm’s income
or operating success. Therefore, creditors and investors are interested in evaluating profitability because
income not only shows the firm’s ability to obtain debt and equity financing; it also shows the company’s
liquidity position and its ability to grow (Weygandt, Kimmel & Kieso 2010).
The trade-off theory proposes a positive relationship between profitability and leverage because high
profitability encourages the use of debt and provides incentives to firms to avail the benefit of tax shields
on interest payments.
The pecking order theory assumes that firms prefer to use internally generated funds when available and
choose debt over equity when external financing is required. Thus, this theory suggests a negative
relationship between profitability (a source of internal funds) and leverage. Several empirical studies have
also reported a negative relationship between profitability and leverage (Sheikh, 2011).
Pecking order theory implies that high profitable firms will use less debt as their financing resources.
With higher profitability, a firm is more capable of fulfilling its needs of financing by using internal
source of fund. Firms will prefer to do so whenever they can to avoid the costs related to the issuance of
securities. This negative relationship between profitability and capital structure is evidenced in the studies
done by Titman and Wessels (1988), Nugroho (2006), Indahningrum and Handayani (2009), and Firnanti
(2011).
3.2 Asset Tangibility (TANG)
The ratio of total fixed asset is to total asset(Chen 2004; Guad et al; 2005). Firms holding more
tangible assets have greater access to borrow money. This is because tangible assets can be used as
collateral, which is a secured payment if the firm becomes incapable of paying back its debt. Besides
being in any creditor's favour, collateral is also beneficial for the firm as it can prevent the firm from
having to go bankrupt when debt cannot be paid (Murhadi, 2011). Therefore, higher tangibility of a firm's
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assets is supposedly followed by higher level of debt. This positive relationship between asset tangibility
and capital structure has been studied and proven by Hadianto (2008), Mas'ud (2008), Kartika (2009),
Murhadi (2011), and Munawar (2012).Myers and Majluf (1984) claimed that firms may find it
advantageous to sell secured debt because there are some costs associated with issuing securities about
which the firm’s managers have better information than outside shareholders.
Thus, issuing debt secured by the property with known values avoids these costs. The result suggests a
positive relationship between tangibility and leverage because firms holding assets can tender these assets
to lenders as collateral and issue more debt to take the advantage of this opportunity. Furthermore, the
findings of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) suggest that the shareholders of highly
leveraged firms have an incentive to invest sub optimally to expropriate wealth from the firm’s debt
holders. However, debt holders can confine this opportunistic behaviour by forcing them to present
tangible assets as collateral before issuing loans, but no such confinement is possible for those projects
that cannot be collateralized. This inducement may also encourage a positive relationship between
leverage and the capacity of a firm to collateralize its debt. Several empirical studies have reported a
positive relationship between tangibility and leverage (Wald, 1999; Chen, 2004; Huang & Song, 2006;
Zou & Xiao, 2006; Viviani, 2008; Jong et al., 2008; Serrasqueiro & Roga˜o, 2009).
3.3 Liquidity (LIQD)
According to Bevan and Danbolt (2000) (as cited in Noryati & Fahmi, 2013) liquidity and leverage has
significant relationship because the firm prefers to choose debt in order to finance their current assets.
The trade-off theory proposes that companies with higher liquidity ratios should borrow more due to their
ability to meet contractual obligations on time. Thus, this theory predicts a positive relationship between
liquidity and leverage.
On the other hand, the pecking order theory guesses a negative relationship between liquidity and
leverage, because a firm with greater liquidities prefers to use internally generated funds while financing
new investments. A few empirical studies have shown their results are consistent with the pecking order
hypothesis. De Haan and Hinloopen (2003) focused their study on the financing preference hierarchy of
Dutch organisations. Besides profitability, they also used liquidity as a proxy. Firms prefer to use their
internal fund first, before they attract external sources to finance. Liquid assets and cash function as an
internal source of finance. A firm use their liquid assets first, before they attract debt (de Jong, Kabir &
Nguyen, 2008).
De Haan and Hinloopen (2003) found that liquidity is strongly positive related to internal finance and
negative to external finance. This means that firms prefer to finance internal, before they attract external
financing as debt. More internal fund means that an organisation will attract less external finance.
Organisations will finance their projects and other investments as much as possible with internal fund,
which does not increase the amount of debt. In this way, liquidity has a negative relationship with
financial leverage. Firms which have a high amount of liquidity do not borrow too much (Deesomsak,
Paudyal & Pescetto, 2004).
De Haan and Hinloopen (2003) found significant evidence that firms used first their liquid assets to
finance. De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2008) found a significant negative relationship for the Dutch firms
between liquidity and financial leverage. Firms first use their cash and other liquid assets instead of debt.
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4. Empirical Result and Discussion
Table 1 demonstrates the descriptive statistics of debt ratio (leverage) for 34 companies for a 10-
year period of 2006 – 2016. The total number of observations (N), used in this research were 340 for each
LEVR, PROF, TANG and LIQD. In addition to the mean – median comparison and standard deviation,
the data is also tested using numerous methods such as the skewness test, kurtosis, the JarqueBera
respectively. This is to discover that the data under review are normally distributed or otherwise.
Table 1. Descriptive analysis
N Min Max Mean Std. Deviation Variance Skewness
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error
Debt Ratio 340 .0047 .7542 2850 .1979 .0392 .2539 .1323
Profitability 340 -.1734 .2797 .0547 .0529 .0028 .2139 .1323
Tangibility 340 .0545 .9895 .7650 .1389 .0193 -.7029 .1323
Liquidity 340 .0013 .9979 .0802 .1513 .0229 3.4230 .1323
The mean for profitability, tangibility and liquidity are 0.0547, 0.7650 and 0.0802, respectively. The
profitability shows that the firms are able to generate net earning 5.47 percent each year. Meanwhile, the
tangibility shows that all the firms are in good performance because they manage to generate investment
for 76.5 percent during the years. The liquidity shows that the firms have more current asset of 8.02
percent to pay for its short-term liability. It illustrates that plantation sector is stable during the period of
the study due to the good performance of the companies.
The skewness quantifies the symmetrical of the distribution. DR, PROF and LIQ are 0.2539, 0.2139
and 3.4230 are positive skew due to the positive value. However, TANG is -0.7029 that is negative skew
due to the negative value and skewed to the left.
Table 2. Regression analysis
Coefficients Standard
Errors
t stat p-value
(Constant) .436 .057 7.613 .000
PROF .286 .168 -6.387 .000
TANG .029 .068 -.619 .536
LIQD -.571 .062 -12.071 .000
R Square 0.3605 Standard Error 0.7181
Adjusted R Square 0.3548
F 19.2858 F stat Sig 0 .0000b
From Table 2, it was predicted that the Leverage (LEVR) was equal to 0.2436 (Constant), + 0.286
(PROF), 0.029 (TANG), -0.571 (LIQD). The constant value for the regression coefficient was in
positive value indicated that the expected value on the dependent variable was in positive value and
greater than 0 when all the independent variables are valued at 0 orlesser than 0 values.
The first coefficient value, 0.436 (PROF) indicated for every Ringgit Malaysia increased in PROF,
there would be RM 0.436 increase in LEVR, holdingother variable at constant. Profitability was the most
important variable that affected the choices in capital structure theories. Most plantation companies tend
to choose debt as the main sourceof capital. The results were consistent with the trade-off theory.The
positive relationship between profitability and leverage because high profitability encourages the use of
debt and provides incentives to firms to avail the benefit of tax shields on interest payments.
Meanwhile, 0.029 (TANG) indicated for every Ringgit Malaysia increased in TANG would cause an
increase for RM29 in LEVR while other variables at constant. The outcome of the empirical result is
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consistent with empirical study conducted by Hadianto (2008), Mas'ud (2008), Kartika (2009), Murhadi
(2011), and Munawar (2012).The result suggests a positive relationship between tangibility and leverage
because firms holding assets can tender these assets to lenders as collateral and issue more debt to take
the advantage of this opportunity.
Lastly,-0.57100 (LIQD) indicated for every Ringgit Malaysia increased in LIQD would decrease –RM
57.00 in LEVR. This result is consistent with Mat Kila and Wan Mahmood (2008)  that there was
negative relationship between LIQD and LEVR of the companies to finance their activities according to
pecking order theory.
5. Conclusion
This research has established the determinants capital structure for the plantation companies in
Malaysia which used leverage as the dependent variable and profitability, tangibility and liquidity as the
independent variable.
Firstly, the results from the findings showed that there ispositive significance relationship between
profitability and leverage for the plantation companies in Malaysia. This proved that changes in
profitability of the firms do affect the leverage level of the firm. For the profitable companies, they are
usingdebt as their choice of financing. This also indicates that trade off theory is relevant to plantation
firms in Malaysia
Secondly, there is significance relationship between tangibility and leverage for the plantation
companies in Malaysia. The leverage level increased with tangibility because the firms would need debt
financing in order to increase the total assets for the firms. Moreover, debt financing was the best choice,
especially the firm that wants to purchase expensive assets.
Lastly, there is insignificance relationship between liquidity and leverage. The result is in line with the
pecking order theory that propagates negative relationship between liquidity and leverage. The firm with
greater liquidities prefers to use internally generated funds while financing new investments. A few
empirical studies have shown that their results are consistent with the pecking order hypothesis.
Following from the finding of this study, future direction of research might consider investigating
further the contradicting insignificant finding tangibility.
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